The Bil'in Libel?

The coverage of Jawaher Abu Rahma's death

November 2011

On Saturday morning, January 1^st 2011, Jawaher Abu Rahma, a 36-year old resident of Bil'in village, died after inhaling teargas fired by the Israeli army at protesters at the weekly protest against the route of the separation fence in the village. The Keshev research that examined the coverage of the story shows that most major media outlets in Israel adopted the various versions the army spread after the incident, and dealt extensively with the battle of versions rather than the serious questions that ensued from the incident, regarding the army's conduct during anti-fence protests.

>> Download the full report

>> IPCC research – Jawaher Abu Rahma: martyr or human? Critical reading of the Palestinian media

>> Richard Silverstein's blog post following a Yesh Din-Keshev event, held after the publication of the report

On Saturday morning, January 1^st 2011, Jawaher Abu Rahma, a 36-year old resident of Bil'in village, died after inhaling teargas fired by the Israeli army at protesters at the weekly protest against the route of the separation fence in the village. Clouds of teargas fired by the soldiers reached the place where Abu Rahma stood, at some distance from the protest. She lost consciousness and was taken by an ambulance to a hospital in Ramallah. The treatment she received failed to save her life, and she passed away in the hospital on Saturday morning.

Palestinian officials, Israeli and Palestinian anti-fence activists, and Abu Rahma's family claim that she was killed as a result of inhaling a lethal dose of teargas fired by the Israeli army at the protesters. The army claimed at first – mainly through anonymous officials – that Abu Rahma was not even at the protest site and that she may have died of cancer. These officials accused the Palestinians of attempting to spread false propaganda for public relations purposes, and mentioned the supposedly similar incident in which 12-year-old Mohammed a-Dura was killed at the beginning of the second intifada.

Three weeks after the incident, on January 19^th 2011, Israeli media published some details from the Central Command inquiry in the matter. According to these reports, the inquiry confirmed that Abu Rahma was injured of teargas inhalation while she was in a building close to the protest site, as the Palestinians have claimed. However, the inquiry report concluded that inappropriate medical care at the Ramallah hospital led to Abu Rahma's death, and hence only the Palestinians – and not the army – are responsible for it. This claim carries an inner contradiction, since if teargas inhalation caused the deterioration in Abu Rahma's medical condition, then the army bears at least partial responsibility for her death, and the Palestinian medical team cannot be regarded as exclusively responsible.

Keshev examined the media coverage of the affair during the week following Jawaher Abu Rahma's death and on the day following the publication of the Central Command inquiry report. The research indicates that most major media outlets in Israel, apart from Ha'aretz, adopted the army's version during both coverage periods, while presenting the Palestinian version as unfounded blood libel – in spite of an abundance of testimonies to the contrary, controversy on the matter within the army, and even a proof that the army spokesperson unit contradicted itself in its reports after the incident.

In addition, all media outlets but Ha'aretz refrained from dealing with the wider context of the protests against the route of the separation fence in Bil'in – a route which was declared illegal by the Israeli High Court of Justice as early as 2007, as well as the conduct of the Israeli army while dispersing these protests and the numerous casualties – including 21 protesters killed. The media hardly questioned the army's media conduct following the incident – especially after the publication of the army inquiry, which showed that the army bore at least partial responsibility for Abu Rahma's death, and that most claims it presented in the week following the incident were entirely unsupported.

Such incidents, where the battle over the public opinion becomes the major issue, serve as fascinating test cases as to the conduct of the Israeli media. They cast a heavy shadow over the Israeli narrative that portrays the Israeli army as "the most moral in the world" and the Palestinians as solely responsible for the violence.

Keshev research shows that in such cases, the Israeli media tends to take an active part in "protecting" Israel's and its army's reputation, while neglecting professional journalistic standards. Here, as in many cases, the media adopted unquestioningly the army's version as to Abu Rahma's death, despite substantial discrepancies found therein and the fact that it was questioned even within the defense establishment.

Moreover, in this case – as in previous similar incidents – the coverage focused only on the battle of versions between Israel and the Palestinians and the question whether the Palestinians were lying, while ignoring the wider context of the story and Israel's responsibility for the continuation of the conflict. Many important issues, such as the reason for the anti-fence protests in Bil'in, the influence of the fence on the Palestinian's daily lives, the disregard for the 2007 court decision that the fence route in Bil'in be moved, critical questions about riot control means widely used by the Israeli army – all these were hardly presented to the Israeli public.

Keshev's Palestinian partner IPCC analyzed the coverage of Jawaher abu Rahma's death in the Palestinian media, as part of the ongoing cooperation between the two organizations.

for further reading:

Keshev report – When the Cannons Roar: From the Gaza Beach to Beit Hanun – Israeli Media Coverage of Killings of Palestinian Civilians in the Gaza Strip (in Hebrew)

This report is made possible by the generous support of the American people through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The contents are the responsibility of Keshev and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the United States Government.